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This paper suggests an alternative framework for 
achieving fiscal discipline in the Euro Area. It is 
argued that national fiscal policies should focus 
on a long-term objective, such as a public debt-
to-GDP ratio, and the common monetary policy 
should focus on a short-term objective, such as 
price and output stability. The result is a self-sta-
bilising set-up where the enforcement problem 
has largely been resolved. 
1. Introduction
It is widely believed that members of a monetary union 
should have their fiscal policies restricted by rules to pre-
vent unsustainable debt developments.1 Otherwise, the 
argument goes, a country allowing its debt-to-GDP ratio 
to grow continuously will create negative spillover effects. 
There are two dimensions to this position: First, with ac-
cess to borrowing in the union-wide capital market, a 
country with excess deficits will drive the union interest 
rate upwards. This may force other member countries to 
follow more restrictive fiscal policies to keep their public 
debt on a sustainable path. Second, the common cen-
tral bank may come under pressure to ease the stance 
of monetary policy, thereby potentially undermining the 
independence of the central bank and creating an infla-
tionary pressure.
Both of these spillover arguments motivate the ex-
istence of a control mechanism to keep budget deficits, 
or debts, below a certain threshold. However, it is not 
uncontroversial to argue in favour of explicit fiscal rules. 
For two reasons: First, financial markets may play an 
important role in preventing governments from pursuing 
overly expansionary fiscal policies. The point is that a risk 
premium will be attached to government debt of a coun-
try in fiscal trouble, leaving the interest rate in a country 
with sound public finances unaffected, and hence there 
would be no spillovers.2 However, whether that actually 
happens or not depends on whether the markets price the 
financial or default risks to the monetary union itself; or 
whether they price the risk to individual countries. If it 
is the former, then spillover effects are present, rules or 
no rules. Second, fiscal rules are typically ineffective since 
experience with such rules show that they are difficult, 
if not impossible, to enforce.3 Either way, fiscal rules are 
likely to be problematic.
In reality, market pressure is typically complemented 
by explicit fiscal rules, but it is still an unresolved question 
what the ideal mix between market pressure and fiscal 
rules is or what those rules should be. In the European 
Union (EU), fiscal rules have been in place for several 
years. The Maastricht Treaty imposed numerical limits 
on the fiscal debt and deficits of those joining the Euro 
Area (EA). Those limits became permanent with the Sta-
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bility and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997. The most recent 
development involves the fiscal compact (FC) which was 
agreed in 2012. This is a balanced budget rule, extended 
by an automatically triggered correction mechanism at 
the national level and a strengthening of the automatic-
ity of the excessive deficit procedure within the SGP if 
the deficit criterion is breached by a member of the EA.
In this paper we offer a critical assessment of the past 
and existing fiscal set-up in the EA, and we consider a 
new framework for achieving fiscal discipline. From here 
the road map of the paper is as follows: We first provide 
a political economy examination of why the SGP has 
effectively failed. Next we review the recent changes to 
the fiscal framework in the EA, focusing on the design 
of the FC. Then we revisit the debate about the objectives 
of fiscal policy, whether fiscal rules should target debt 
or deficits, and how to co-ordinate fiscal and monetary 
policies. This is followed by an outline of how an excess 
debt protocol might be constructed to give enforceable 
form to such a regime. Finally, we argue that fiscal rules 
should be set in a forward-looking fashion to allow for 
the impact of projected demographic changes and other 
implicit liabilities.
2. The Failure of the Stability and Growth Pact 
The SGP was adopted in 1997, prior to the creation of the 
euro, in order to ensure that fiscal discipline is maintained 
in the member states.4 The Amsterdam Treaty which gov-
erns the working of the SGP defines a country to have an 
excessive fiscal deficit if both that country’s deficit exceeds 
3% of its GDP, and if the Council of Ministers judges 
it to have done so. This leaves open the possibility that 
the Council of Ministers will judge the deficit not to be 
beyond the 3% limit on the grounds that the excess is ei-
ther excusable, or only temporary; or because the excess is 
measured incorrectly or has appeared for reasons beyond 
the accused government’s control. In effect, the SGP has 
proved to be unenforceable in practice. 
Two facts suggest why the SGP is difficult to enforce. 
First, deficits are to a large extent endogenous, as revenues 
and expenditures fall and rise around the cycle. Thus, 
slow or negative growth will typically make a given deficit 
ratio rise, even if the deficit itself has not changed. This 
gives plenty of scope for arguing that a deficit is tem-
porary or unexpected and beyond the violating govern-
ment’s control. Second, when France and Germany had 
exceeded the 3% limit for two years, without accepting 
the sanctions or deficit reduction plans imposed upon 
them, their cases were referred to the European Court of 
Justice. However, the Court found in favour of Germany 
and France precisely because the Council of Ministers 
had not declared them to be in excess of the 3% limit. In 
effect, the credibility of the enforcement process was lost.
Since a necessary condition for enforcing the SGP is 
that the Council of Ministers declares a country to be in 
violation of the excessive deficit procedure, there clearly is 
a „sinners-sitting-in-judgement-of-sinners“ problem here. 
This is so since the Council includes representatives of 
the violating government and unanimity is required in 
matters of taxation and fiscal policy. Even if unanimity 
is taken away, there is very little incentive for countries 
to vote to support an excessive deficit decision and sanc-
tions. Indeed, it could be claimed that the SGP will fail 
almost by construction, as the only incentive to adhere to 
it is the risk of a new financial and debt crisis.
In fact, an accused government will have a natural 
incentive to veto such a decision or to try to promote a 
veto. Meanwhile other council members, whether they 
also have excessive deficits or not, have a strong incentive 
to provide a veto on the argument that „it will be our turn 
next, so a veto now will bring a veto in our favour next 
time“. More worrying still are the possibilities that coun-
tries will form coalitions to vote against such decisions 
in support of one another. They will do so in their own 
perceived short term self-interest on the argument that 
some countries are too big to fail, or that it would be too 
dangerous to the rest of the community and to the voting 
country in particular, in terms of deflationary spill-overs, 
if the accused were forced to cut back its deficits sharply. 
As France and Germany push for sanctions for EA 
members who break borrowing limits, both countries are 
among the worst offenders. Wyplosz (2012) has shown 
that, of the 12 original members of the single currency, 
10 have run up budget deficits beyond the 3 per cent limit 
since 1999. From 1999-2011, Greece has broken the rules 
every year, Portugal in 10 of those years and Italy eight. 
Next is France (seven), followed by Germany (five). In 
contrast, Ireland, which had to be bailed out because of 
the state of its public finances, was outside the 3 per cent 
limit in four of those years. Spain, which like most EA 
countries is adopting tough austerity measures to put its 
public finances in order, also broke the rules in four of 
those years. Only Luxembourg and Finland were within 
the limit every year. 
In sum, automatic sanctions for EA countries run-
ning deficits above 3 per cent are all very well in principle, 
but the procedures for addressing non-compliance have 
lacked automaticity. Only two countries have managed 
to consistently fulfil the criteria, and financial sanctions 
have never been imposed. The SGP has not succeeded in 
securing fiscal discipline, and it is far from clear whether 
any new sanctions will be enforced. It is difficult to see 
how this process will not again become mired in political 
ANDREW HUGHES HALLE T T & SVEND E. HOUGA ARD JENSEN TEMA 53
wrangling between the EU and member states, especially 
if one of the larger core countries, say France, is in vio-
lation of the rules. It therefore seems unlikely that the 
SGP, even as currently constituted, would ever produce 
a judgement that a country was in violation of the exces-
sive deficit rule and should be sanctioned, especially if it 
involves a large country.
3. Recent Revisions of the Fiscal Framework in 
the Euro Area
The recent changes of the economic governance frame-
work in the EU/EA have taken place in several incremen-
tal stages. The starting point is the European Semester, 
agreed in June 2010 by the European Council, which is 
an instrument to ensure consistency between monetary, 
fiscal and structural policies. A few months later, in Sep-
tember 2010, the European Commission published their 
ideas of what would constitute an effective system of fiscal 
restraints to provide long term financial stability. These 
proposals specify a debt target of 60%; that countries 
with debt ratios exceeding 60% should show adequate 
progress to reaching that target, defined as eliminating 
1/20th of the excess over 60% each year; and that each 
economy with a persistent excess debt ratio on this crite-
rion should pay a fine of 0.2% of GDP each year. There 
was also a proposal that the growth in public spending 
should not exceed the growth in GDP. Moreover, these 
proposals added a „debt brake“, meaning that current 
spending must be balanced across the cycle. However, 
the sanction or penalty to be imposed on those who fail 
to meet this condition, what definitions of current spend-
ing and cycle should be used, and how compliance with 
such a condition can be measured in real time, are all 
questions that remain unresolved. But they need to be 
resolved before they become constitutionally embedded. 
The Euro Plus Pact, also referred to as the Competitive-
ness Pact, was agreed in March 2011. While mentioning 
a better coordination of economic policy as the main 
objective, the real focus was to improve competitiveness 
in order to obtain a higher degree of convergence. There 
were provisions that countries unable to improve their 
competitiveness, or correct persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances, will be fined 0.1% of GDP each year. How-
ever, what constitutes „persistent“, or what criteria define 
„competitiveness“, and which imbalances should be tar-
geted, are matters that remained to be agreed. Popular 
suggestions are to increase the retirement age, or restrict 
wage increases to no more than productivity growth. 
Under the term the „six-pack“, five regulations and 
one directive entered into force at the inter-governmental 
summit meeting in December 2011. It was decided not to 
create a pan-European treaty to implement the ideas set 
out in the Commission’s September 2010 report, but to 
create instead an inter-governmental agreement in which 
the main ideas of the new enhanced SGP could be set. 
In March 2012 the Heads of State or Government of 
all EU countries (with the exception of the UK and the 
Czech Republic) signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG), see European Council (2012). The most impor-
tant component of the TSCG is the fiscal compact (FC), 
which states that the budgetary position of the general 
government shall be balanced or in surplus. The rule is 
respected if the annual structural balance of the general 
government is at its country-specific medium-term objec-
tive, defined as a maximum structural deficit of 0.5% of 
GDP at market prices. 
If significant deviations from the medium-term ob-
jective or the adjustment path towards it are observed, a 
correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. 
The mechanism shall include the obligation to implement 
measures to correct the deviations over a defined period 
of time. These rules shall take effect in the national law 
of the EA member state at the latest one year after the 
entry into force of the FC through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, 
or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered 
to throughout the national budgetary processes.
The EA members may temporarily deviate from their 
medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it 
only in exceptional circumstances, namely if the ratio of 
government debt-to-GDP at market prices is significantly 
below 60%, and where the risks to the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances are low. In such situations, 
the lower limit of the medium-term objective can reach 
a structural deficit of at most 1.0% of GDP at market 
prices. Otherwise, when the ratio of their general gov-
ernment debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 60% reference 
value, the member shall reduce it at an average rate of one 
twentieth per year as a benchmark. If the Court of Justice 
of the European Union finds that the country concerned 
has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it 
a penalty payment capped at 0.1% of its GDP.
Two other conditions have been added. First, all 
member governments have agreed to allow their budget 
plans and performance to be inspected and commented 
on by Commission officials. So the Commission may 
begin to act a little like the Stability Council discussed 
below. Second, the voting on whether sanctions should be 
applied to those who breach this FC has been changed. 
Before, a qualified majority of countries had to vote to 
impose a fine on any country deemed to have violated the 
SGP’s 3% deficit limit, otherwise no fine. Now, the fine 
would be imposed automatically, and a qualified major-
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ity has to vote to get a fine lifted. Fines are therefore far 
from automatic since blocking coalitions are relatively 
easy to construct. 
While the sanctions process is somewhat stronger 
than before, the fiscal compact is likely to be difficult to 
implement and enforce. This is due to a legal aspect which 
is often neglected by economists. The point is that the UK 
and the Czech Republic decided not to sign the TSCG. 
Since two EU members were not willing to commit to the 
TSCG, it takes the form of an intergovernmental treaty 
outside the EU legal framework, and as such it does not 
need to respect the EU Treaties. Indeed, the UK made 
it very clear that they would not accept the TSCG to 
become part of EU law. Therefore, the treaty is based on 
ordinary international law rather than EU law. 
With this weaker legal status of the FC compared to 
the SGP it may well become even less enforceable than 
the failed SGP. As is well-known, EU law (regulations, 
directives and decisions) take precedence over national 
law and are binding on national authorities. For example, 
it is only within the EU legal framework that (a) the EU 
Commission is allowed to submit cases for the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and (b) the relevant en-
forceability mechanisms apply, such as the legal appara-
tus which makes it possible to levy fines etc. By contrast, 
if the anchor for the FC is ordinary international law, it 
is up to the individual states to take each other to court, 
and this is unlikely to happen very often for the reasons 
identified in Section 2. It should be noted that the inten-
tion is to incorporate the substance of the TSGE into the 
EU Treaties within at most five years following its entry 
into force, and it is hoped that it will be applied and 
interpreted in conformity with EU law even before that.
The bottom line is that the fiscal compact is long 
on good intentions but short on substance (Gros, 2012). 
However, there is a potentially important addition to 
the compact, namely that only EA countries following 
the compact will be eligible to receive support from the 
permanent bail-out fund, the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM). This may prove an effective enforcement 
channel but it clearly remains to be seen how powerful 
it is in practice.
4. An Outline of an Alternative Macroeconomic 
Policy Framework in the Euro Area 
In this section we outline a framework for the conduct 
of fiscal policy, discuss whether fiscal policy should be 
stated in terms of debt or deficit targets, and finally we 
explain how fiscal and monetary policies could be better 
co-ordinated. 
4.1. Short-term vs. long-term orientation of fiscal policy
The role of fiscal policy has traditionally been twofold: 
first, to serve as an instrument for macroeconomic stabili-
sation purposes (demand management) in the short term 
and, second, to achieve certain political objectives in the 
medium-to-long term, such as (a) the size of the govern-
ment sector, (b) the allocation of resources across different 
public activities and (c) the distribution of wealth and in-
come through the tax and transfer system. More recently, 
with most countries suffering from public debt problems, 
the main objective of fiscal policy seems to have shifted 
towards keeping public debt on a sustainable path. In any 
case, fiscal discipline has become a major concern. 
We believe that fiscal policy is not easily reversible, 
or easily used for stabilisation, if consistency across time 
and different policies is to be maintained. Moreover, 
depending on the details of the budgetary process, the 
implementation lag may be quite long for changes in in-
struments of fiscal policy, and this lack of flexibility may 
undermine the usefulness of fiscal policy for stabilisation 
purposes. 
Admittedly, in the real world, and certainly in a Eu-
ropean context, there is a caveat to the premise that fiscal 
policy has a long-term orientation. In fact, although the 
European fiscal rules were founded on long-term targets, 
they were not respected, as discussed extensively in sec-
tion 2. Similarly, while one could concur that fiscal policy 
is not suitable for stabilization, the experience from the 
recent crisis, with widespread use of stimulus packages 
etc., seems to suggest the opposite. 
However, these facts do not rule out that a fiscal 
framework based on a long-term orientation is the ap-
propriate design for the future, i.e. after the disruptions 
of the financial crisis. And again, while focusing on long 
term targets we recognize that fiscal policy could play a 
role as a stabilization device, as long as the longer term 
objectives would not be jeopardized for the sake of short-
term objectives. Specifically, if the common monetary 
policy is not stabilizing enough at the individual country 
level, the fiscal stabilisation objective is permitted only if 
debt sustainability is not compromised.
4.2. Debt vs. deficit targets
Against that background, we proceed on the assumption 
that fiscal policy is better conducted in terms of long-term 
rather than short-term objectives. This naturally brings us 
to a discussion of whether fiscal authorities should target 
the public debt (a stock) or the public deficit (a flow). We 
have argued elsewhere that debt targets are superior to 
deficit targets, both for theoretical and practical reasons 
(see, e.g., Hughes Hallett and Jensen, 2012).5 Here we 
briefly revisit this discussion.
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We start by offering a technical argument why a stock 
target is more appropriate than a flow target. The reason is 
that fiscal deficits, and hence public debt, are endogenous 
and subject to random shocks, whether external shocks, 
policy errors or temporary indiscipline. Any fiscal con-
trol regime must therefore designate a „safe zone“ around 
the preferred target value within which the debt ratio 
can fluctuate freely; and specify a self-stabilising control 
mechanism to ensure that the debt ratio automatically 
returns to its target following a shock. 
The implication of a „safe zone“ is that any govern-
ment that goes beyond it to higher levels of debt will have 
to be rescued. Many rules can satisfy those requirements. 
But an element common to all of them is that, in order 
to control a target variable so as to ensure that it eventu-
ally converges on its designated target value, the decision 
rule for the policy instrument must follow a difference 
equation of at least the same order as that governing the 
behaviour of the target, and one degree higher if full 
convergence is to be possible (Salmon, 1982). A deficit 
rule cannot satisfy those conditions, unless there are no 
dynamics in the system, but a debt rule (driven by the 
accumulation of past deficits) automatically does so. In 
technical language, we move from proportional to inte-
gral control rules.
Turning next to some more practical aspects, the first 
point to make is that debt targets are helpful because 
they focus on the ultimate risk: unsustainable public fi-
nances. An important question is whether hard or soft 
targets should be chosen. We prefer soft targets (a band, 
or a debt ceiling) since, compared to a setting with hard 
targets, decision making is less likely to become disabled 
by arguments over the precise definition and measure-
ment of the target, or the arbitrary nature of a numerical 
limit. In addition, soft targets introduce flexibility into 
policy making, so that the pro-cyclicality of hard targets 
is reduced, along with the tendency of rigid targets to 
block reforms whenever the latter have short run costs. 
Soft targets can also accommodate the positive effects of 
a deficit, and allow different national priorities, although 
simplicity and fairness suggest uniform limits might be 
imposed in the long run. Moreover, a soft target version 
allows policymakers to trade off good years against bad. 
In effect, because the target is a stock not a flow, this 
produces a cyclically adjusted fiscal rule without the extra 
difficulty of having to actually calculate the cyclically 
adjusted deficit accurately. 
Finally, since debt is a stock and therefore more per-
sistent, a debt rule gives policy makers a greater incentive 
to obey the rules: first, to preserve freedom of manoeuvre 
in the future and, second, to save at the top of the cycle 
and therefore remain „within target“ in the future. 
4.3. Co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policy
Fiscal policies need to be co-ordinated, not only among 
themselves to avoid threats of instability and adverse 
spillovers on others, but also with monetary policy to en-
sure consistency and commitment to inflation goals and 
financial discipline. It is important that fiscal policy be 
handled this way so that it does not undermine monetary 
discipline, and does not trigger an overreaction by the 
monetary authorities when governments are attempting 
to stabilise employment or reach their objectives.
As we have argued repeatedly, fiscal policy lends it-
self naturally to longer term objectives. This provides an 
element of (Stackelberg) leadership, in the sense of fiscal 
authorities „going first“. The leadership role derives from 
the difference in timing: fiscal policy has long-term tar-
gets and monetary policy short-term targets. In effect, 
this is an intertemporal assignment, where fiscal policies 
directed at long-term objectives are set first, and then 
followed by, or combined with, an independent mon-
etary policy directed at short-run demand management 
objectives. That framework creates a basis for rule-based 
co-ordination between policymakers without the need 
for explicit negotiations, and where each policy would 
operate according to comparative advantage.
Finally, since debt targets imply a degree of persis-
tence, especially in countries with higher levels of public 
debt, they can be used to pre-commit fiscal policies to a 
path which is consistent with the expected stance of the 
independent monetary policy. Hence they are well suited 
to achieve the twin goals of sustainable public finances 
and limited spillovers on others. Moreover, because a debt 
target is more persistent, it facilitates the creation of cred-
ibility and commitments for the future. From here we get 
the fiscal pre-commitment we need; but only if monetary 
policy follows (with a shorter horizon) to provide the 
threat of punishment to any deviant fiscal policy making.
5. Debt Targets in Practice
The problem with any fiscal control rule is whether it can 
withstand the pressure to undermine its enforceability, as 
the EA experience with the SGP process amply illustrates. 
With this critical dimension in mind, we propose the 
following enforcement mechanism, based on the govern-
ance principles outlined in the previous section:
A. The debt targeting system should be set up for each 
government as a target value and an upper boundary 
or ceiling (both expressed as a percentage of GDP);
B. The space between the target and upper boundary 
should be divided into three equal ranges;
C. The debt target values may be specific to each country, 
at least in the transition from today’s high debt ratios 
to more reasonable values for a long term framework. 
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But they are more likely to reach and follow a com-
mon value thereafter.
By way of illustration, if the debt target was set as a 45% 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and the ceiling at 60% in normal 
times, the excessive debt protocol range could be divided 
into three: from 45% to 50%; from 50% to 55%; and 
from 55% to 60%.6 
The first range would be the range of normal fluctua-
tion and would require no immediate action or comment 
(a debt ratio being a structural indicator, is less volatile 
and slower moving than a deficit). 
If the level of debt entered the second range, the gov-
ernment would be placed on a watch list and be subject to 
comments and advice from an independent Fiscal Policy 
Commission (FPC).7 Any financial assistance from the 
FPC or other governments, any liquidity provision to 
domestic firms or banks by the central bank, or comfort 
statements from the FPC to reassure the markets, would 
become conditional on policy improvements being un-
dertaken and subject to joint oversight. 
If that government’s level of debt entered the third 
debt range, this would trigger public warnings and spe-
cific policy recommendations to remain in place until the 
55% ratio or less is regained. At this point, any assistance, 
loans, or bail-out guarantees would become strictly con-
ditional on those recommendations being implemented 
and carried out to the FPC’s satisfaction. 
Finally, if the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio rose 
above 60%, all bail-out guarantees would be suspended 
and any new or refinanced debt would be priced accord-
ing to market forces with an explicit no bail-out provision 
attached.
The principle threat to domestic policymakers is that 
this step will be known in advance. Moreover, any fur-
ther European or IMF support would only be offered 
if the government is able to accept the „assistance“ of 
Euro Area or European Commission officials in running 
government spending and taxation until the 60% limit 
or better was regained. In other words, the national fiscal 
authorities would be placed in administration.
Any loans or assistance invoked under the excessive 
debt protocol would be channelled through the EA au-
thorities (or the European Commission). To pay for that, 
the EA authorities could use its own funds plus a levy 
imposed of 0.25% of GDP say for each percentage point 
that any deficit (symmetrically for any participant) had 
exceeded the 3% limit in the period in which public debt 
was in one of the upper two excessive debt ranges. This 
levy would be lifted only in quarters in which growth was 
recorded as negative. Those conditions would be agreed 
and made public before the regime started, and each gov-
ernment’s progress in relation to them would be assessed 
and discussed in public by the FPC. The point of this 
fund would be to provide some risk sharing properties, 
IMF style, between the EA governments.
Apart from a mild fiscal penalty designed to slow 
down the expansion of excessive deficits in the debt con-
ditionality ranges, the real sanction in this protocol is 
that the possibility of any loan, bail-out or other help 
is strictly conditional – and known to be so. Once the 
public debt-GDP ratio goes beyond the 60% barrier, any 
further assistance is withdrawn and the national govern-
ment will be abandoned to the mercy of the markets. 
Since this fact will be well-known in advance, and 
that any breaches come with two zones of warning, it 
should act as a break on imprudent debt expansions (ex-
cept in severe recessions) and should guard against the 
dilemma of moral hazard. In fact, given the warnings and 
the threat of outside control, any government that none-
theless transgressed the 60% debt-to-GDP limit would 
likely be subject to a severe political backlash and incur 
escalating borrowing costs. Note also that the penalties in 
this scheme are ex ante: designed to withhold what a gov-
ernment would like to have (fiscal freedom, guarantees, 
lower borrowing costs), rather than to remove something 
which they already have (resources for a fine).
Finally, in view of the fact that most EA countries are 
well above the 60% limit, the political relevance of our 
proposal might in the current situation appear doubtful. 
However, the fact that many countries have debt ratios 
above 60% is not really relevant. Rather, what we present 
is a medium-to-long term, or post-crisis, proposal. So we 
assume that some of the current proposals to mutualize 
and control debts will be adopted. That implies a stage-
wise return to 60%, exactly in accord with the new fiscal 
compact of 2012.8 
6. Further Perspectives on Debt: Accounting for 
Implicit Liabilities
If a debt targeting rule is chosen, the question arises: what 
public debt level, or debt-to-GDP ratio, should be tar-
geted? One approach would be to draw on the empirical 
research which has established a link between public debt 
and economic growth. For example, in the oft-cited study 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) it is found that debt-to-
GDP ratios above 90% tend to hamper economic growth. 
Bringing debt ratios below 90% would most likely be 
desirable from the perspective of economic growth, and 
such studies would hence offer a useful empirical basis for 
deriving the level of public debt that maximises economic 
growth rates.
A more sophisticated theoretical approach is given in 
Aschauer (2000) where the optimal level of public debt 
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is expressed in terms of the public-to-private capital ra-
tio. This will allow us to determine and calculate the 
best level of public debt for any specific economy and 
sample period. Such a rule does of course imply some 
kind of golden rule or „debt brake“ in the long run since, 
across the cycle, current government spending has to be 
financed by current revenues rather than borrowing. In 
steady state, the debt ratio will become constant, as con-
firmed in empirical work by Aizenman et al. (2007). If 
maintained, such a rule would imply sufficient capital 
cover in the economy as a whole for the public borrowing, 
which is just a matter of good banking practice.
As discussed by Auerbach (2009), the search for an 
optimal level of public debt involves other complicated 
trade-offs. For example, how should concerns about in-
tergenerational equity be balanced against economic per-
formance (inflation, investment, growth etc.) and long 
term fiscal sustainability? In fact, bringing debt ratios 
below 90% may be desirable from the perspectives of 
both long-term economic growth and sustainability of 
public finances, as discussed above, but the fiscal restraint 
involved might be thought to place an unfair burden on 
current generations. 
The problem of choosing a target for public debt also 
involves the question about whether or not to account for 
implicit liabilities. Typically, the government liabilities 
entering the calculation of government debt only include 
explicit liabilities. However, if we think of these liabilities 
as requiring future revenues in order to avoid default, us-
ing an explicit debt criterion only by itself can be highly 
misleading. If implicit liabilities are ignored, it means 
failure to account for the budgetary impact of future li-
abilities originating from, notably, ageing populations, 
despite the fact that future revenues will be needed to 
cover the benefits that have been promised to existing 
workers and beneficiaries. This is the case for extending 
the existing debt targeting proposals to include predict-
able demographic changes, see Bokan, Hughes Hallett 
and Jensen (2012). 
Several papers, including Kotlikoff (2006) and Davig 
et al. (2010), have emphasised the fiscal „overhang“ posed 
by the uncovered expected financial liabilities associated 
with public pension schemes and likely health and social 
support costs in most OECD economies. A recent paper 
by IMF (2009) has put this problem into dramatic form 
by showing that the financial stress caused by the great 
financial crash of 2007-10 was probably only about 10% 
of that likely to be caused by future age related spend-
ing in economies with a shrinking labour force. Against 
that, if fiscal sustainability is now the objective, it makes 
sense to search for fiscal rules capable of ensuring the 
sustainability of public finances given ageing populations, 
shrinking labour forces and greater implicit liabilities. 
In fact, the EAs fiscal compact fails to account for 
those serious concerns. Therefore, we find that balanced 
budget rules, key to the fiscal compact, are not appropri-
ate. Instead, more sophisticated fiscal rules are needed 
which allow for the implicit liabilities that are generated 
by projected changes in the age-structure of the popula-
tion. The implication is that a government facing a de-
mograhic change, or the need to adjust to more social 
spending, will have to adjust their fiscal plans to accom-
modate those changes. Therefore, forward-looking rules 
are likely to call for even more severe austerity measures 
than those already made necessary to resolve the sover-
eign debt crisis in the EA.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has provided a critical assessment of the fiscal 
set-up in the Euro Area, including the fiscal compact that 
was introduced recently. Based on serious enforceability 
problems associated with past fiscal arrangements in Eu-
rope, we have proposed an alternative macroeconomic 
framework for achieving fiscal discipline. The key idea is 
an intertemporal assignment where national fiscal poli-
cies focus on long-term objectives and a common mon-
etary policy on short-term objectives. 
A natural way to pre-commit fiscal policy in a form 
that can be combined with independent monetary poli-
cies, but without any explicit negotiations that might 
compromise monetary independence, is to make fiscal 
policy „lead“ in the sense of being the first to decide and 
for a longer period of commitment. This idea can be im-
plemented by giving the fiscal authorities an explicit debt 
target to provide the pre-commitment mechanism to a 
long-term objective and slow moving target variable. We 
have further argued that the debt target should be set in a 
forward-looking fashion to account for implicit liabilities, 
such as the discounted budgetary impact of changing 
demographics in addition to conventional debt measures.
That framework creates a basis for rule-based co-
ordination between policymakers without the need for 
explicit negotiations, and the result is a self-stabilising 
set-up where the enforcement problem has largely been 
resolved. Once the monetary authority knows the (cred-
ible) long-run path of fiscal policy, it is free to choose 
a monetary policy that fits best in terms of achieving 
their objectives. Should fiscal policies deviate from their 
chosen path, monetary policies can quickly counteract to 
cut out any unwanted consequences. This threat would 
normally be enough to persuade fiscal policymakers to 
stick with their announced path. 
58 T IDSSKRIF TE T POLIT IK  IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?
notes
1. There is a large academic literature on the implications for fiscal 
policy of monetary unification in Europe, see, e.g., Hughes Hallett, 
Hutchison and Jensen (1999). 
2. Recent studies on European interest rate spreads (e.g., Mink and 
De Haan, 2012) find evidence of contagion, in particular across 
southern European countries.
3. Based on data collected for the American states, von Hagen (1991) 
found that explicit fiscal rules had only little impact on budget defi-
cits. 
4. Recent studies evaluating the SGP include Buti, Eijffinger and 
Franco (2003), European Central Bank (2005), Fischer, Jonung 
and Larch (2006), Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2007) and 
Schuknecht, Moutot, Rother and Stark (2011).
5. In Denmark, for example, a policy of public debt targeting is widely 
regarded to have been very successful for a decade or so, see An-
dersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2008).
6. Recent work by the European Central Bank (Checherita, Hughes 
Hallett and Rother, 2012) has shown how to calculate optimal debt 
targets from first principles based on intertemporal decision mak-
ing. Applying this to the OECD and the EA countries, respectively, 
they obtain optimal debt ratios of 67% for OECD countries and 
50% for EA members, both reported as averages. So, a target of 50% 
and a ceiling of 60% make sense for the EA. At this stage, numbers 
have not been found for individual countries, which is an obvious 
task for future research.
7. On the role of and experiences with fiscal policy councils, see Calm-
fors and Wren-Lewis (2011). 
8. In fact, a report by the President of the European Council (Van 
Rompuy, 2012), prepared for the European Summit on 26 June 
2012, appears to have endorsed the idea of debt limits and desirable 
debt levels individually by country. However, the wording in the 
report (prepared in close cooperation between the Presidents of the 
Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank) is a 
bit vague and no position is taken as to what the reference values 
should be in practice. 
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